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NOTES 
Rolling Down the Curtain on "Roll-Ups": The Case for 
Federal Legislation To Protect Limited Partners 
Kenneth R. Hillier 
During the early 1980s, millions of investors sought high returns 
and tax advantages through participation in real estate limited part-
nerships (RELPs).1 RELPs would purchase one or more pieces of real 
estate. The general partner or an entity related to the general partner 
would often manage this property, and the revenues from the rental of 
the property would flow to the limited partners and to the general 
partner after the deduction of operating expenses and management 
fees. Generally, the partnership was intended to be of a limited dura-
tion. 2 The partnership agreement would specify a time span during 
which the property would be sold. After the liquidation of the RELP 
assets, the proceeds were to be distributed to the limited and general 
partners and the RELP would dissolve. 3 
Many of the RELPs' tax advantages disappeared with the passage 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.4 Combined with the general slump in 
the real estate industry, 5 this led many limited partners to seek buyers 
for their partnership interests. Because of the lack of an organized 
market, however, limited partners could sell their interests only at a 
sharp discount to the actual value of the underlying real estate. 6 
1. Kirstin Downey, Congress Is Probing New Partnership Deals, WASH. Posr, Aug. 4, 1990, 
at El. Syndicators raised about $68 billion between 1979 and 1988. Id. It is estimated that 
small investors invested $50 billion in RELPs during the early 1980s. Mary Rowland, The 
Hazards of Roll-Ups, N.Y. TlMEs, July 22, 1990, § 3, at 16. 
2. The typical duration of a RELP is 7 to 15 years. Testimony of Richard C. Breeden, 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, before the Senate Subcommittee on Se-
curities, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, at 6 n.3 (Feb. 27, 1991). 
3. Rowland, supra note 1. The typical partnership agreement prohibited the reinvestment of 
proceeds of property sales. 
4. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 101 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (1988)). The Tax Reform Act restricted the deductibility of cer-
tain partnerships and reduced the tax rate for upper-income individuals from 50% to 33%, 
thereby eliminating the RELPs' tax advantages. See Immanuel Ness, Officials Say Most Partner-
ships Still Profitable, NATL. UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH/FIN. SERV. ED., Sept. 11, 1989, at 
50. 
5. See, e.g., Real Estate.· 5-year Slump, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1990, at 91 (predicting con-
tinuation of nationwide slump in real estate market caused by over-building during the 1980s); 
Ness, supra note 4, at 50 (Many RELPs were "hurt by the decline of the real estate 
market. ••• "). 
6. The lack of an organized market for RELP shares, which represent interests in private 
limited partnerships, makes the investment harder to sell, thereby reducing its liquidity. Invest-
ing in Real Estate Syndicates for a Tax Break, Bus. WK., Feb. 7, 1983, at 99. See infra section 
155 
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Many RELP general partners seemingly came to the rescue of the 
limited partners, promising liquidity for the RELPs through a "roll-
up," which merges two or more limited partnerships. The resultant 
rolled-up entity (RUE) can take the form of a corporation or a master 
limited partnership.7 Because the RUE can be traded on a public 
stock exchange, the investment is more liquid. 8 Other supposed bene-
fits of roll-ups include reduced operating costs through economies of 
scale and greater access to capital markets.9 To date, a total of more 
than $1.5 billion worth of RELPs have been "rolled" into RUEs; ex-
perts estimate RELPs worth more than $3 billion are awaiting roll-
ups. Io 
In part because RELP general partners need only receive a major-
ity of "yes" votes from the limited partners to proceed with the roll-
up, approval of the transaction is practically automatic. I I The results, 
however, have been far from spectacular. Generally, RUE share 
prices have plunged dramatically after introduction to the stock mar-
ket, Iz resulting in a number of tales of inheritances and retirement 
I.A.3 for a discussion of the relation between share prices and the value of the underlying real 
estate. 
7. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, N.A.S.D. Sets Rule for Brokers of Limited Partnerships, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 1991, at D8 (discussing corporations); Howard Rudnitsky, Roll-Up as Rip-Off, 
FORBES, June 27, 1988, at 254, 254 (discussing master limited partnerships). Master limited 
partnerships are partnerships whose interests may be publicly traded. See Eric M. Zolt, Corpo-
rate Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A State of Disequilibrium, 66 N.C. L. REV. 839, 
869 n.151 (1988). 
8. RELP interests were not designed to be traded on a public exchange. See Rudnitsky, 
supra note 7, at 254; Kevin Salwen, House Panel Told Partnership Forms Are Too Complex, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1990, at Cl ("partnerships . • . designed as long-term untraded 
investments"). 
9. Sean S. Subas & Brent Donaldson, Roll-Up Alchemy: Iron to Gold or Gold to Iron?. REAL 
Esr. FIN. J., Fall 1988, at 29, 30. Margaret Opsata lists four alleged advantages: greater diversi-
fication, more efficient management, greater flexibility in debt structure, and greater liquidity. 
Margaret Opsata, What's Wrong with Roll-Ups?, FIN. PLANNING, May 1990, at 48, 48. 
10. Letter from Senators Christopher J. Dodd and John Heinz to SEC Chairman Richard C. 
Breeden, quoted in Kirstin Downey, Tough Rules Are Sought on ''Roll Ups," WASH. Posr, Oct. 
6, 1990, at El. 
11. In two recent roll-ups, a few partnerships voted against the roll-up and did not partici-
pate. Breeden, supra note 2, at 28. Almost every other roll-up proposal presented to limited 
partners, however, has been approved. Many observers feel this high rate of approval is due to 
the fact that brokers soliciting votes from the limited partners are paid commissions (usually two 
percent) for each "yes" vote but nothing for a "no" vote. See, e.g., Jane B. Quinn, With Partners 
Like These • .• , NEWSWEEK, July 2, 1990, at 41; Downey, supra note 1; Opsata, supra note 9, at 
53; Rowland, supra note 1; Rudnitsky, supra note 7 at 256. Thus, brokers have considerable 
incentive to exaggerate the benefits of roll-ups. 
12. For example, Liquidity Fund, Inc., a firm specializing in RELPs, provides the following 





Performance of Real-Estate Roll-Ups 
Value assigned 1st trading Closing price on 
at conversion date 1st trading date 
$20.00 7/23/87 $16.38 
10.00 6/26/87 6.88 
50.00 10/8/87 20.00 
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funds lost. 13 This has led some observers to assert that only the gen-
eral partner gains from a toll-up.14 
Observers suggest several reasons for the disappointing perform-
ance of RUEs. The high fees incurred by the RELPs during the roll-
up process may lower their value; 15 profitable RELPs often become 
lumped with unprofitable ones;16 general partners fuel unrealistic ex-
pectations by projecting overly optimistic results; 17 and RUEs, unlike 
their predecessors, are subject to the scrutiny of the stock market, 
which emphasizes current earning capability over long-term apprecia-
tion potential.18 Whatever the reasons, the dismal performance of 
RUEs19 has led many to question the wisdom of such transactions.20 
One flaw in the roll-up process is the helplessness of a limited partner 
who does not want to participate in the transaction. As long as a ma-
jority of the limited partners approves the roll-up, the "dissenting" 
limited partner has no option but to exchange the RELP shares for 
shares in the new RUE. 
This Note examines roll-ups and the lack of alternatives available 
to reluctant limited partners. Part I focuses on existing judicial reme-
dies for limited partners, such as injunctions and actions for damages, 
and explains why these courses of action provide inadequate protec-
tion. This Part then reviews recent attempts at statutory protection 
and points out the shortcomings of these remedies. Part II examines 
safeguards afforded analogously situated corporate shareholders and 
sets forth arguments why limited partners should receive similar pro-
tection. After demonstrating the need for legislation, Part III suggests 
Rowland, supra note 1. See also Kirstin Downey, ''Roll-Ups" Elicit Wrath of Investors, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 22, 1991, at B3 (citing example of roll-up of Concord Milestone partnership, which 
plunged from an appraised value of $9,417 at the time of the roll-up (Oct 1990) to $2,767 by 
Mar. 1, 1991). 
13. See Getting Rolled in ''Roi/ups," NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1991, at 43 (telling story of 77-
year-old investor losing 80% of $125,000 which she had planned to leave her sons); Catherine 
Collins, Limited Partnership ''Roll-Ups" Catch the Attention of Congress, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 
1990, at K2 (Rep. Barbara Boxer lamenting that "[m]any of my constituents have seen their 
savings substantially eroded by roll-ups ..•• Some have seen IRAs or other retirement savings 
wiped out"). 
14. See Jill Bettner, Partnership ''Roll-Ups" Can Spell Trouble, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1990, 
at Cl. 
15. Barry Vinocur, editor of Stanger's Investment Advisor, estimates the typical cost of a roll-
up to be $11 million to $12 million. Rowland, supra note 1. In one roll-up, 10% to 12% of the 
assets of the RELP were used to pay the roll-up expenses. Opsata, supra note 9, at 54. Much of 
this money is paid to the general partner. 
16. Kevin Salwen, Investors May Get Some SEC Help on Partnerships, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 
1991, at C17. 
17. Opsata, supra note 9, at 53; cf Salwen, supra note 16. 
18. RUEs have investment lives of SO years or more. Thus, the stock market's assessment of 
a RUE's value centers on income rather than asset value. Subas & Donaldson, supra note 9, at 
31. 
19. See supra note 12. 
20. See, e.g., Subas & Donaldson, supra note 9; Rudnitsky, supra note 7. 
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a workable structure for this statutory protection. Then, the Note dis-
cusses the relative virtues of federal and state action and concludes the 
need for quick, uniform action dictates that the federal government, 
rather than the states, should act in this area. Finally, the Note dis-
cusses recent congressional activity on the subject of roll-ups. 
I. CURRENT LACK OF ADEQUATE REMEDIES 
Currently, limited partners who prefer not to participate in a roll-
up face a Robson's choice between selling their shares at a sharp dis;-
count21 and utilizing judicial action either to prevent the roll-up22 or 
recover damages after the formation of the RUE.23 The former alter-
native, for obvious reasons, is an unattractive one; the latter rarely 
succeeds.24 Recent legislative attempts offer remedies,25 but, unfortu-
nately, the existing solutions fail to address several important consid-
erations, such as the fairness of using market value to measure the 
RELP shares' worth. 
Part I of this Note explains the lack of available remedies for dis-
senting limited partneri. After a discussion of general litigation-re-
lated problems in section I.A.1, section I.A.2 examines the possibility 
of enjoining the roll-up through a preliminary injunction. Then, sec-
tion I.A.3 explores the possibility of maintaining an action for dam-
ages after the roll-up has been completed. Finally, section I.B 
discusses one state's recent attempt to protect limited partners. 
A. Existing Judicial Remedies 
1. General Problems Concerning Litigation 
Before examining the specific inadequacies of existing judicial rem-
edies, 26 it may be useful to describe more general impediments to effec-
tive use of the judiciary by dissenting limited partners. These general 
barriers exist in other types of securities litigation initiated by inves-
tors and, hence, are not unique to the RELP investor. But due to the 
specific character of the RELP investor, these problems are especially 
severe. 
The cost of litigation creates one barrier. While this expense may 
be worthwhile for large, institutional investors, the typical holders of 
RELPs only invest approximately $10,000 each.27 A suit brought to 
21. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra section I.A.2. 
23. See infra section I.A.3. 
24. See infra sections I.A.2 and I.A.3. 
25. See infra section I.B. 
26. See infra sections I.A.2-1.A.3. 
27. Liquidity Fund, Inc., estimates that there are currently 7,948,560 limited partners with 
an average investment of $10,259. 
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enjoin a roll-up,28 or recover damages after the roll-up,29 would almost 
certainly cost a sizable portion of the average roll-up investor's hold-
ing. 30 Although the roll-up may prove costly to the RELP investor,31 
allowing the roll-up to proceed may be less expensive than litigation 
for most RELP investors. 
If the limited partners banded together, either informally or in a 
class action, litigation would be more affordable. Unfortunately, infor-
mal alliances prove logistically difficult to form and maintain. The 
investors must ascertain the identities of other investors, determine 
their opposition to the roll-up, and then organize the litigation.32 Sim-
ilarly, class action suits sometimes reduce costs, but they are not with-
out their problems, including conflicts of interest33 and excessive 
attorneys' fees, 34 which may more than offset this cost reduction. Ex-
28. See infra section I.A.2. 
29. See infra section I.A.3. 
30. Many securities lawyers work on a contingent-fee basis. Unfortunately, the possibility of 
such an arrangement, which offers some hope to p!aintiffs who otherwise could not afford to 
bring suit, does not solve the RELP investor's problem. Because most RELP investors have 
relatively small holdings, the expected recovery by each plaintiff in such a suit is correspondingly 
small. Thus, a RELP investor may experience considerable difficulty finding an attorney to take 
the case on the mere chance of earning a percentage of such a small recovery. 
31. For example, consider the four partnerships discussed supra note 12. Using the values 
assigned at conversion, these four RUEs declined an average of 84%. While some of this decline 
may be due to the slump in the real estate ~ket, one can hardly suppose the underlying real 
estate declined 98.7%, as did the Centennial shares, or even 84%. 
Exaggerated share values at conversion may also partially account for these dramatic crashes 
of share prices. The general partner often has considerable incentive to exaggerate the share 
values. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. While it is impossible to say with confi-
dence exactly how much an investor stands to lose in a roll-up, estimates range as high as 90%. 
See Rep. Stark Introduces Bill to Combat Roll-Up Transactions, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 85, 
at G-6 (May 2, 1990). 
32. In the absence of transaction costs, such as information problems, it might be possible for 
dissenting partners to unite and oppose the roll-up in litigation. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). But because RELP holders do not tend to be sophisticated 
investors, information problems do exist and, hence, there are transaction costs. See infra note 
35. 
33. One problem is the conflict of interest between the attorney and the class. See Mary Kay 
Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TExAs L. REV. 
385, 389 (1987) (noting that the lack of control by class action plaintiffs over their attorneys leads 
to an inordinate decisionmaking power on the part of the attorney which, in turn, creates "poten-
tial for conflicts of interest to go unnoticed"); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Com-
pensation. Dete"ence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 56-58 (1975) (asserting that 
the attorney's stake in settling is substantially greater than that of the plaintiffs); Developments in 
the Law - Class Actions, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1318, 1537 (1976) ("Private negotiations of class 
action issues raise a particularly great danger of inadequate representation .••. "). 
The interests of the named plaintiff can also conflict with the interests of the class. See Dam, 
supra, at 56-57; Developments in the Law - Class Actions, supra, at 1537. The last piece 
observed: 
During bargaining the class attorney may be forced to rely more heavily than usual upon the 
named plaintiff to determine class desires. A plaintiff and his attorney may erroneously 
conclude that the representative party's views mirror those of the class, leading them to 
make concessions .•• disproportionately costly [to the] absentees. 
Id. at 1537. 
34. See Developments in the Law- Class Actions, supra note 33, at 1605 (''The •.• disparity 
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pense thus remains a very real obstacle facing disgruntled RELP fun-
ited partners. 
The generally unsophisticated nature of the RELP investors simi-
larly limits the possibility of litigation-oriented relief.35 Small RELP 
holders who oppose the roll-up may not know they have any recourse 
other than voting "no.', Indeed, such investors may fear incurring the 
ire of the general partner, knowing they may remain partners with 
their adversary after the litigation. Even if these investors were so-
phisticated, the weak financial condition of many general partners36 
makes them unattractive defendants. Facing such roadblocks, the dis-
senting RELP limited partner steps into the litigant,s batter,s box with 
two strikes. The specific barriers to roll-up litigation, discussed below, 
effectively provide the strike-out pitch. 
2. Injunctive Relief 
To prevent a roll-up, a limited partner may attempt to halt the 
transaction by first obtaining a preliminary injunction before comple-
tion of the roll-up, and then prevailing at a full trial on the merits.37 
Although Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,38 which 
governs preliminary injunctions in federal courts, does not set forth 
specific grounds for denying or granting relief, courts have developed a 
standard formulation.39 Usually, four factors control: (1) the likeli-
hood of the plaintiff prevailing on the merits; (2) a balancing of the 
harm to the plaintiff with the harm to the defendant if the injunction is 
granted; (3) the public interest; and (4) the threat of irreparable injury 
to the plaintiff upon the denial of the injunction. 40 The application of 
between attorneys' fees and the benefits class actions confer upon individual class members has 
.•• led some critics to suggest that class actions are in fact 'lawyer's lawsuits,' •••• "). 
35. Most RELP limited partners are individuals holding modest investments. See supra note 
27. Small investors tend to possess a lower level of understanding of investments and legal reme-
dies. See Tamar Frankel, What Can Be Done About Stock Market Volatility?, 69 B.U. L. RBv. 
991, 997 (1989) (arguing against luring small investors back into the stock market). 
36. See Jill Bettner, SEC, Congressional Panel Investigate 'Roll-Up' to Check Fairness to In-
vestors, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1990, at CS. 
37. The limited partner's cause of action against the general partner could be based on any 
number of theories, including inadequate disclosure, breach of contract, or breach of fiduciary 
duty. 
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a). 
39. 11 CHARI.ES A. WRIGIIT & ARTHUR K. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2948 (1973). 
40. Professor Moore asserts the showing of irreparable injury and likelihood of prevailing on 
the merits are the most important factors. 7 JAMES w. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE 1J 65.04[1], at 65-54 (2d ed. 1991). 
If the dissenting limited partner seeks an injunction in state court, there is a good chance he 
or she still must show irreparable injury. See, e.g., Suffolk County Assn. of Mun. Employees v. 
County of Suffolk, 557 N.Y.S.2d 946, 948 (App. Div. 1990) (New York courts require showing of 
irreparable harm to the plaintiff.); Campau v. McMath, 463 N.W.2d 186, 189 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1990) (Michigan requires showing of irreparable harm.); Kanter & Eisenberg v. Madison As-
socs., 508 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ill. 1987) (Illinois requires showing of irreparable harm.). But see 
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this formula rests in the discretion of the trial court.41 
The "threat of irreparable injury" requirement creates problems 
for the dissenting limited partner. "Irreparable injury" is usually de-
fined tautologically as "harm that has or will occur [which] cannot be 
repaired."42 Any harm compensable by money damages usually falls 
outside this definition. 43 An exception to this principle does exist - if 
the damages are impossible or excessively difficult to calculate, the 
harm is deemed irreparable.44 
Utilizing this exception to the money damages principle is difficult 
at best. The RELP investor will have difficulty demonstrating incalcu-
lable damages. The simple measure of damages incurred as a result of 
the roll-up is the value of the RELP shares before the roll-up minus 
the value of the RUE shares after the roll-up (the "before and after" 
measure).45 Typically, cases in which damages have been ruled incal-
culable46 have involved situations where the denial of the preliminary 
injunction would lead to an "after" value which cannot be measured.47 
The difficulty in the roll-up case, on the other hand, exists in the 
"before" measurement because the market price of the RUE shares 
represents, by definition, the "after" value. The key to ascertaining 
the appropriate "before" value is choosing the correct method of 
valuation of the preroll-up RELP interests, namely, whether to use the 
RELP's market value or net asset value.48 As such, the problem for 
the RELP investor is not one of calculating or measuring damages; 
rather, it is one of proving damages. Consequently, the exception for 
incalculable damages probably would be of little help to the RELP 
limited partner. 
Even if this avenue were more promising, strategic considerations 
might weigh against exploiting it. The dissenting limited partner 
would have to prepare for the possibility that the court would deny the 
Cooke v. Superior Court, 261 Cal. Rptr. 706 (Ct. App. 1989) (California balances interim harm 
to both plaintiff and defendant.). 
41. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311U.S.282, 290 (1940); 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, 
supra note 39, § 2948. 
42. 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2944, at 401 (citing Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 
360 F.2d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1966) (Judge Friendly explaining, "[A]ll that 'irreparable injury' 
means .•• is that unless an injunction is granted, the plaintiff will suffer harm which cannot be 
repaired.")). 
43. See, e.g., Nuclear-Chicago Corp. v. Nuclear Data, Inc., 465 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1972); 
Bieski v. Eastern Auto. Forwarding Co., 354 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1965); American Visuals Corp. v. 
Holland, 219 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1955). 
44. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prod., Inc., 690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982); Standard 
& Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982); New York Pathological 
& X-Ray Lab., Inc. v. INS, 523 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975). 
45. For a more complete discussion of damages in roll-up cases, see infra section l.A.3. 
46. See supra note 44. 
47. These cases often involve the loss of future sales, which would prove incalculable due to 
many factors. See Standard & Poor's Corp., 683 F.2d at 711. 
48. See infra section l.A.3. 
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preliminary injunction, thereby allowing the roll-up to proceed, and 
might wish to preserve the ability to pursue an action for money dam-
ages after the roll-up occurs.49 As part of the damages action, the 
limited partner will have to plead the measure of damages and will 
want to assert that this measure is logical, if not patent. Most litigants 
are likely to be wary of making such an argument after earlier arguing 
that the damages are incalculable. The dissenting limited partner may 
forgo use of the exception for incalculable damages to avoid being 
caught in this position. 
In a recent article, so Professor Douglas Laycock disputes the exist-
ence of an irreparable injury rule. He asserts "[c]ourts have escaped 
the rule by defining adequacy [of damages] in such a way that damages 
are never an adequate substitute for plaintiff's loss."st Thus, Laycock 
believes the irreparable injury rule represents nothing more than a 
means for judges to reach their desired result. 
Laycock's argument appears promising to dissenting limited part-
ners, who could explain their plight and hope the court sympathizes. 
Accepting Laycock's thesis over the views of other authorities,s2 how-
ever, does not automatically lead to the conclusion that preliminary 
injunctions are available to dissenting limited partners. If, as Laycock 
suggests, preliminary injunctions are granted or denied based on the 
result desired by the judge, a judge still may not want to prevent a roll-
up already approved by a majority of the limited partners. Given the 
magnitude of the roll-up problem,s3 reliance on the perceived arbitrary 
nature of the preliminary injunction apparatus would be ill-advised. 
Thus, Laycock's thesis does not correct the lack of remedies available 
to RELP limited partners. 
A full hearing on the merits would occur only after a preliminary 
injunction motion succeeds. The court's decision to grant a perma-
nent injunction focuses on the existence of an adequate remedy at 
law.s4 This test is not the equivalent of the irreparable injury test; 
rather, a showing of irreparable injury represents but one way to show 
that no adequate remedy at law exists. ss A finding of a threat of irrep-
arable harm in the preliminary injunction proceedings does not fulfill 
the "no adequate remedy" test for a permanent injunction. s6 Thus, 
49. See infra section I.A.3. 
50. Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687 
(1990). 
51. Id. at 691. 
52. See, e.g., 7 MOORE, supra note 40, 1J 65.04[1], at 65-54; see also 11 Wrumrr & MILLER, 
supra note 39, § 2948, at 431 (The showing of irreparable harm is "[p]erhaps the single most 
important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction."). 
53. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
54. 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 39, § 2944, at 392. 
55. Id. at 399-401. 
56. Id., § 2947, at 423. 
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even in the event of a successful preliminary motion, the dissenting 
limited partner would still have to relitigate the issue of irreparable 
injury at trial. 
In summary, injunctive relief is difficult to obtain. The time and 
expense required by such a strategy further decreases the likelihood it 
will even be attempted. A plaintiff must be prepared to fight an uphill 
battle to obtain a preliminary injunction, which, even if successful, 
only delays the roll-up until a full hearing on the merits. At trial, the 
plaintiff must relitigate the entire issue of irreparable harm to show the 
lack of an adequate remedy at law. Success at trial, of course, cannot 
be guaranteed. Thus, injunctive relief offers little hope to a dissenting 
limited partner. 
3. Action for Damages 
As an alternative to preventing the roll-up through an injunction, a 
dissenting limited partner may allow the roll-up to proceed and then 
sue to recover damages. The difference in value between the preroll-
up RELP shares (the "before" value) and the postroll-up RUE shares 
(the "after" value) represents the simple measure of damages. Unfor-
tunately, this measure is "simple" only with respect to the "after" 
value; the court can easily determine the worth of the RUE shares by 
looking at the price of the RUE shares traded in the stock market. 57 
The "before" value, on the other hand, is a more complicated matter, 
due to the illiquidity discount associated with RELP shares. Because 
no ready market for RELP shares exists, these shares trade for less 
than they would in a value-efficient market. 58 
In a value-efficient market, the market value of a security will 
equal the present value of the expected cash income flowing from that 
security.59 In the case of a RELP, this would be the value of the un-
derlying real estate (the "net asset value'').60 The illiquidity of the 
RELP shares, however, results in a market price below the RELP's 
net asset value. Because of this discrepancy, each party to the litiga-
57. The simplicity of the "after" is simple assuming there is no dispute over the timing of 
that value. Realistically, however, the parties could argue over which market price is appropriate 
- the price of the RUE share immediately after introduction to the market, or the RUE share 
price at some later date. 
58. See Opsata, supra note 9, at 48 (Limited partners attempting to sell must "search for 
buyers on the secondary market [and] sell for less than their units [are] worth."). 
59. See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash. and the Fraud on the Market 
Theory, 74 CoRNELL L. REV. 907, 913 (1989) (defining "value efficiency" as the "extent to which 
security prices reflect the present value of the net cash flows generated by [the enterprise's] 
assets"). 
60. This is true assuming the real estate market is also value-efficient, taking into account all 
future cash flows (such as rental income, sale income, and expenses). As used in this Note, "net 
asset value" means the amount the limited partner would receive if the real estate were liqui-
dated. It therefore takes into account the partnership's cash distribution scheme and transaction 
costs which normally stem from such a liquidation. 
164 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:155 
tion will certainly attempt to use the value most favorable to it; the 
general partner will argue for use of the market price as the "before" 
value while the dissenting limited partner will champion the higher net 
asset value. 
Market value is an attractive method to those who believe no se-
curity is ever worth more than what it would bring in the marketplace. 
The illiquidity of the RELP, the general partner could argue, resem-
bles any market fact which is characteristic of the investment and af-
fects its value. As such, according to this line of reasoning, the 
"before" value should reflect this illiquidity. 
While this argument has some appeal, a closer examination of 
RELPs shows net asset value to be the more appropriate "before" 
value. Judicial proceedings and security laws should protect legiti-
mate investor expectations. 61 RELPs, as real estate investments with 
fixed termination dates, represent the type of investment many intend 
to hold until the partnership dissolves. 62 In this respect, RELPs differ 
from corporate stocks, which have no termination date. Thus, use of 
the market value of the RELP as the "before" value unfairly penalizes 
the RELP investor for the illiquidity of an investment the investor 
may have never planned to sell. Because the investor expected to real-
ize full net asset value at termination, use of the net asset value as the 
"before" measure clearly fits the investor's expectations. 
In a sense, the roll-up is a forced sale. The general partner and the 
majority of limited partners, by approving the roll-up, force the dis-
senting limited partners to exchange their RELP shares for RUE 
shares. As such, the dissenting limited partner's situation parallels 
that of a minority shareholder forced to sell shares in a buy-out ap-
proved by the majority of stockholders. Several courts have found illi-
quidity discounts in the computation of premerger value to run 
counter to the goal of protecting minority shareholders. 63 Professor 
Charles Murdock, examining this situation in the corporate merger 
context, likewise found the illiquidity discount to be inappropriate. 
The action of those in control, by setting in motion events which lead 
to the buy-out of the minority (thereby providing liquidity), forecloses 
the minority from participating in any future growth or future advanta-
61. See Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders 
and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 465-71 (1990) 
(describing the evolution of the reasonable expectations test as a means of defining "oppressive" 
management conduct); Robert B. Heglar, Note, Rejecting the Minority Discount, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
258, 266. 
62. See Subas & Donaldson, supra note 9, at 32. 
63. See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989) (rejecting use of 
"marketability" discount in Delaware's appraisal remedy); In re Valuation of Common Stock of 
McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997 (Me. 1989) (finding application of "nonmarketability" discount 
would run "directly counter to [Maine's] appraisal statute's purpose of protecting dissenting 
shareholders"). For a discussion of state appraisal statutes, see infra notes 94-106 and nccompa· 
nying text. 
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geous sale. Having lost the ability to alienate these shares more advanta-
geously, it would again be paradoxical to discount minority shares for 
lack of alienability when the majority, through triggering a buy-out have 
created a market now but foreclosed the possibility of a more attractive 
market later. 64 
Similarly, in the roll-up situation, it would be paradoxical and unfair 
to discount the RELP shares for their illiquidity when the general 
partner and the majority foreclosed the possibility of realizing the full 
net asset value at the original termination date. 
Furthermore, there are reasons to doubt the accuracy of market 
value as a measure of the RELP shares' worth. In his landmark arti-
cle, Professor George Akerlof set forth the "lemons market" theory. 65 
Akerlof asserted that in markets where consumers could not easily 
distinguish goods on the basis of quality, consumers will only be will-
ing to pay for average quality goods. 66 This tendency keeps higher 
quality goods out of the market. Consumers then adjust their assess-
ment of the worth of an average quality good, driving prices even 
lower. Market value therefore fails to reflect accurately the true value 
of the goods. While commentators have cautioned against the applica-
tion of this theory to securities such as stocks, 67 the RELP market 
possesses the primary characteristic of a lemons market. In the RELP 
market, buyers lack the information necessary to assess the true value 
of the RELP shares. 68 Furthermore, the quality of RELPs varies 
widely.69 Thus, buyers may only be willing to pay for a RELP share 
of average quality. This strongly suggests market value may not be 
the accurate indicator of worth its supporters would claim it to be. 
Unfortunately, these justifications for net asset value do not ensure 
that the dissenting limited partner will prevail on this issue at trial. In 
the absence of a statute dictating a method for valuing the RELP 
shares, a court may be persuaded to adopt the market value approach 
put forth by the general partner. 7° First, the court may be influenced 
by the ease of ascertaining the market value. Determining this value 
involves no more than a cursory examination of trades involving the 
RELP in question; ascertaining net asset value, on the other hand, 
64. Murdock, supra note 61, at 488. 
65. George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970). 
66. Id. at 489. 
67. See, e.g., William Camey, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Cor-
porate Control: An Agency Cost Modei 1988 WIS. L. RE.v. 385, 405 n.105 (securities markets not 
lemons markets with respect to management performance); Joshua Ronen, Sale of Controlling 
Interest: A Financial Economic Analysis of the Governing Law in the United States and Canada, 
37 CASE W. REs. L. RE.v. I, 12 (1986) (noting "arrangements in the American capital market 
that minimire the adverse selection bias" described by Akerlot). 
68. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
69. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing lumping of profitable RELPs with 
unprofitable ones). 
70. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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involves a certain amount of conjecture as to the value of the underly-
ing real estate. Yet the ease of calculating market value does not jus-
tify its use. The purpose of a damage award is to restore the injured 
plaintiff to his or her previous position; 71 if damages are to serve their 
function, ease of measurement must yield to fully compensating plain-
tiffs. 72 Use of market value would frustrate the limited partner's at-
tempt to gain redress for the injuries brought about by the roll-up.73 
Second, a court may find further reason to resort to market value 
as the "before" measure by analogizing to case law or statutes devel-
oped for more common securities, such as stocks.74 In many in-
stances, such authorities will dictate use of market value. 75 But these 
71. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 503 (8th ed. 
1988) (Compensatory damages are intended to "restore [the plaintiff] to the position he occupied 
before the tort."). This proposition also holds true for cases brought in contract rather than in 
tort. See III E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CoNTRACI'S § 12.8, at 186 (1990) 
(''The basic principle for the measurement of th[e]se damages is tha~ of compensation based on 
the injured party's expectation. One is entitled to recover an amount that will put one in as good 
a position as one would have been in had the contract been performed."); cf. Hadley v. Bax-
endale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854) (Damages "should be such as may ••• reasonably be 
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as 
the probable result of the breach of it."). 
72. Similarly, the fact that real estate valuation is not an exact science should not sway the 
court. It is true that two real estate appraisers may give different estimates of the value of the 
same property. See Jeff B. Coopersmith, Comment, Refocusing Liquidated Damages Law for 
Real Estate Contracts: Returning to the Historical Roots of the Penalty Doctrine, 39 EMORY L.J. 
267, 286 n.96 (1990). But the court should avoid allowing the imprecise nature of this damages 
measure to preclude effective compensation of the plaintiffs. The general partner and the major-
ity of the limited partners, by approving the roll-up, have created this situation wherein the 
parties must resort to an imprecise measure of damages. See supra note 64 and accompanying 
text. Thus, the plaintiffs should not be the ones to suffer the consequences of the lack ofa way to 
find the "true" value of the property. Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th 
Cir. 1987) (court may engage in some degree of speculation as to damages when imprecision is 
result of defendant's wrongdoing). 
73. As a part of this obstacle of convincing the court to use net asset value as the "before" 
measure, the plaintiff has the burden of proving many facts (such as expectations) which arc 
more easily "proved" to a legislature once than to courts in each case. Cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 
U.S. 298, 368 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (purpose of employing irrebuttable Miranda pre-
sumption of coercion in fourth amendment setting is to avoid a complicated "fact-bound in-
quiry"). 
It is conceivable that the market value of a RELP could exceed its net asset value, due to 
factors such as superior management of the partnership. There is little evidence to suggest this 
occurs with any frequency, as the illiquidity discount would normally more than offset any such 
factor. 
74. Indeed, the limited partner's complaint may compel the court to rely on such authority. 
Because limited partners cannot resort to any effective statutory protection, they may be forced 
to plead their causes of action under these analogous security cases or statutes. 
75. In California, for example, the relevant case law for securities holds market value to be 
the normal measure of value. See Peek v. Steinberg, 124 P. 834, 836 (Cal. 1912). Furthermore, 
California's statutory damage formulae do not translate well to the roll-up situation. See, e.g., 
CAL. CoRP. ConE § 25501 (Deering 1979) (Section 25501 sets forth the measure of damages for 
offering or selling a security while making an untrue statement of material fact or omitting a 
statement of material fact. The statute sets forth four measures of damages, none of which trans-
lates well to a roll-up. The statute seems to envision the more common transaction wherein a 
buyer pays cash in exchange for a security. In a roll-up, however, the "buyer'' exchanges his or 
her RELP shares for a security.). 
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authorities ignore fundamental differences between securities such as 
stocks and RELPs. For example, while stocks usually represent 
shares of ownership in an ongoing enterprise, RELP shares constitute 
interests in an entity with a finite life.76 Use of authorities which fail 
to take these differences into account exacerbates the limited partner's 
quandary resulting from the lack of an adequate remedy. But unless a 
court can rely on law developed specifically for RELPs, it may feel 
constrained to use authorities ill-fitted to the limited partner's 
situation. 
Finally, the general partner may convince the court to use market 
value by pointing out the formal structure of the RELPs. Technically, 
the limited partners in a RELP own a security rather than the under-
lying real estate. 77 The general partner could argue that the court 
should therefore use market value rather than net asset value to assess 
the worth of the limited partners' holdings. Such reasoning exalts 
form over substance and distracts the decision maker from :finding a 
measure of damages which will truly return the injured plaintiffs to 
their previous position. By focusing on the technicalities of the RELP, 
the court may instead penalize the limited partners for the illiquidity 
of the RELPs.78 In the absence of a statutory remedy, any one of 
these arguments by the general partner may result in an improper 
measure of damages. 
B. Existing Statutory Remedies 
On September 18, 1990, California Governor George Deukmejian 
signed into law a bill introduced in response to pleas from disgruntled 
limited partners.79 The law amended California's statutory regulation 
of limited partnerships to provide dissenting limited partners with the 
right to require the partnership about to be rolled-up to purchase the 
dissenter's interest. This statute, patterned after state appraisal reme-
dies, 80 appears at :first glance to solve the roll-up problem, at least in 
California. Closer scrutiny reveals several flaws which still leave the 
RELP dissenter without effective protection. 
Section 15679.2(a) of the California Corporations Code sets forth 
the investor's "dissenter's rights": 
If the approval of outstanding limited partnership interests is required 
for a limited partnership to participate in a reorganization, ... then each 
limited partner of the limited partnership holding such interests may, by 
76. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
77. See infra note 176 and accompanying text. 
78. This ignores the fact that the original RELP agreement contemplated the limited part-
ners receiving a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the underlying real estate. See supra 
note 3. 
79. CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 15679 (Deering Supp.1991). 
80. See infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text. 
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complying with this article, require the limited partnership to purchase 
for cash, at its fair market value, the interest owned by the limited part-
ner in the limited partnership .... 81 
The statute's requirement that the partnership repurchase the dis-
senting partner's shares at "fair market value" is its first flaw. As dis-
cussed earlier, net asset value more fully compensates the dissenting 
limited partner. 82 Furthermore, a statute providing the right to sell a 
security at fair market value seems redundant, because an investor al-
ways retains that right. This language, to be fair, does provide some 
relief to RELP investors. First, the law provides the limited partner 
with a buyer. 83 Second, ~he statutory definition of "fair market value" 
as the value "as of the day before the first announcement of the terms 
of the proposed reorganization, excluding any appreciation or depreci-
ation in consequence of the proposed reorganization,"84 allows the dis-
senting investor to recapture any loss in value resulting from the 
announcement of the roll-up. 8s 
While this first flaw, the use of market value, inhibits the law's 
effectiveness, the second flaw renders the statute largely useless. The 
statute applies only to "domestic limited partnerships formed on or 
after January 1, 1991,"86 so the billions of dollars worth of RELPs 
formed during the 1980s87 may still be rolled up without any remedy 
for the dissenting limited partner. Because virtually no new partner-
ships are currently being formed, this law is essentially an exercise in 
futility. 88 
While several other states have attempted to address the problems 
springing from roll-ups, no state has enacted a truly effective statute. 89 
81. CAL. CoRP. ConE § 15679.2(a) (Deering Supp. 1991). 
82. See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text (arguing that penalizing an investor for the 
illiquidity of an investment which the investor may never have intended to sell is inappropriate). 
83. This statutory arrangement may be distinguished from a put option. With a put option, 
the holder of the option has the right to sell the security at a fixed price. See BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990). This statute, on the other hand, does not provide a fixed price; 
rather, that determination is left to the court. 
84. CAL. CoRP. ConE § 15679.2(a) (Deering Supp. 1991). 
85. See Bettner, supra note 14 ("Bad news, including a pending roll-up, only sends [prices] 
lower."). Another desirable feature of this statute is its tendency to promote agreement between 
the dissenter and the partnership on a buy-out price. See CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 15679.5 (Deering 
Supp. 1991). Furthermore, the statute would narrow the issues at trial, thereby reducing the 
expense associated with the litigation. 
86. CAL. CoRP. ConE § 15679.13 (Deering Supp. 1991). 
87. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
88. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Of course, a proponent of this statute could 
argue that future changes in the tax law or the real estate market may cause a revival of partner-
ship formation and, therefore, this statute does serve a purpose. Given the likelihood of such 
changes and the amount of RELPs currently subject to roll-ups, one may certainly question the 
wisdom of expending the effort to pass a law under such an assumption. 
89. Three other jurisdictions have recently provided appraisal rights to limited partners con-
fronted with roll-ups. See D.C. CoDE ANN. § 41-428(h) (1990); MD. CoRPS. & AssNS. CODE 
ANN. § 10-208(f) (Supp. 1990); 1990 N.Y. LAWS ch. 950 (to be codified at N.Y. PARTNERSHIP 
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Thus, the remedies available to the dissenting limited partner remain 
inadequate. 
II. THE ANALOGY TO APPRAISAL STATUTES 
In the absence of statutory protection, the dissenting limited part-
ner's predicament closely resembles that of a corporate shareholder 
opposing a fundamental change in the corporation.9° For example, a 
corporate shareholder opposing a merger,91 like the RELP investor, 
owns an interest in an entity that will soon cease to exist due to the 
actions of the majority. Without statutory protection, the sharehold-
ers face a choice of tendering their shares92 or selling in the open mar-
ket. This choice mirrors the alternatives available to the RELP 
investor.93 For the RELP limited partner, the similarities regrettably 
end there, for unlike RELP limited partners, dissenting corporate 
shareholders have recourse to state appraisal remedies. 
All fifty states and the District of Columbia currently offer ap-
praisal proceedings to corporate shareholders opposing a merger.94 
While these fifty-one statutes vary in their procedures and applica-
tions, most seek to compensate the dissenting shareholders for the 
"fair value" of their shares. 9s While providing access to the courts, 
the statutes also encourage negotiation between the parties by either 
requiring or emphasizing negotiation before the appraisal proceeding 
may commence.96 
Appraisal statutes arose in response to a desire for change in the 
nature of corporate govemance.97 At common law, corporate acts 
such as a merger required unanimous shareholder consent.98 Under 
this system, courts would block mergers and other "fundamental" 
LAW art. BA § 121-1102). While each of these statutes awards "fair value" rather than "fair 
market value," two of the three laws (District of Columbia and Maryland) do so by referring to 
the dissenters' rights afforded corporations' shareholders. Under such a statute, courts are likely 
to rely on market value as they normally do for valuing stocks. See supra notes 74-75 and 
accompanying text. 
90. Such a "fundamental change" might be a merger, sale of all or a substantial portion of 
corporate assets, or sale of corporate stock. See Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Rem-
edy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. RE.v. 829, 831-33 (1984). 
91. This section will focus on mergers, the closest analogy between the dissenting limited 
partner and the corporate shareholder. 
92. The shareholder trades his shares for shares in the newly formed entity or for money, 
depending on the transaction. 
93. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
94. See, e.g., ALA. CooE § 10-2A-163 (1987); ALAsKA STAT. § 10.06.576 (1989); CAL. 
CoRP. CooE § 1300 (Deering 1977); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 910 (McKinney 1986). 
95. See, e.g., ALA. CooE § 10-2A-163 (1987). 
96. Seligman, supra note 90, at 830. 
97. 12B WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CoR-
PORATIONS § 5906.1 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1984). 
98. Id. 
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changes in the corporation at the request of a single dissenting share-
holder. As one commentator described: 
These restrictions on the majority were serious impediments to the 
sweeping reorganizations in structure which modem needs had made the 
order of the day. Consequently statutes were passed in most states con-
ferring wide powers on the majority or a specified percent of the stock, to 
amend the charter, sell, consolidate, merge, etc. In enacting such stat-
utes, however, it was realized that it was necessary to afford some relief 
to dissenters, with the result that in most jurisdictions statutes were en-
acted which give the dissenters the right to receive the cash value of their 
stock and provide for an appraisal where no agreement as to value can be 
reached.99 
Professor Melvin Eisenberg has lauded appraisal statutes, noting 
that the remedy ·•not only serves the function of permitting sharehold-
ers to withdraw under certain circumstances at a fair price, but also 
serves as a check on management."100 Despite the many difficulties 
inherent in the remedy, 101 Eisenberg has concluded appraisal rights 
should be granted even where the dissenters have recourse to a market 
for their shares. 
[W]hile it would not be irrational to eliminate appraisal rights as to 
shares which are traded under conditions which are likely to insure the 
existence of a continuous and relatively deep market, it seems more 
advisable to retain the appraisal right even in such cases, partly to pro-
tect the fair expectations of those shareholders whose legitimate expecta-
tions center on the enterprise rather than on the market, and partly to 
serve as a well-designed emergency switch to check management 
improvidence.102 
Fifteen years after Eisenberg's observations, Professor Joel Selig-
man critically examined the appraisal remedy, exhibiting greater trust 
than Eisenberg in the market's ability to provide fair value.1°3 For 
Seligman, the crucial question was whether a given transaction may be 
fairly characterized as disinterested.104 An appraisal remedy, Selig-
man argued, should be available for interested transactions, such as a 
parent-subsidiary merger.105 In a disinterested transaction, however, 
the appraisal remedy is not necessary to provide a check on manage-
ment. Managers, frequently owners of the corporation's stock, "usu-
ally will associate their best interest with that of their fellow 
99. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 
(1941) (The change to majority vote "opened the door to victimization of the minority."). 
100. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modem 
Corporate Decisionmaking, 51 CAL. L. REV. 1, 84 (1969). 
101. Id. at 85 (Eisenberg notes the appraisal remedy is "always technical; it may be expen-
sive;" and "it is uncertain in result."). 
102. Id. at 86. 
103. Seligman, supra note 90, at 838-40. 
104. Id. at 840-41. 
105. Id. at 841. 
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shareholders .... "106 
While Eisenberg and Seligman disagree on a great deal, both anal-
yses support the provision of an appraisal remedy for dissenting RELP 
limited partners. Eisenberg's desire to protect the expectations of 
"shareholders whose legitimate expectations center on the enterprise 
rather than on the market"107 applies with equal force to limited part-
ners who invested in RELPs believing the RELP was a fixed-duration 
instrument108 and knowing that no ready market for the RELPs ex-
isted.109 The second benefit of appraisal remedies put forth by Eisen-
berg, providing a check on management, also dictates availability of a 
remedy for dissenting limited partners. Currently, in the absence of a 
remedy for the limited partners, general partners continue to promote 
roll-ups despite strong evidence that such transactions greatly damage 
the interests of the limited partners.110 This continued practice shows 
the necessity of some sort of check on the general partners. 
Seligman's analysis leads to the same conclusion. His view that 
appraisal rights are necessary when conflicts of interest prevent man-
agers from protecting investors' interests applies to roll-ups as well. 
To say that the RELP general partner, in promoting a roll-up, is less 
than "disinterested" greatly understates the problem. m A general 
partner has conflicts of interest in several respects. The general part-
ner receives large fees from the transaction.112 Usually its position 
also becomes more secure through changes to the partnership agree-
ment allowing removal only upon a seventy-five percent vote of the 
RUE shareholders instead of the fifty percent requirement usually 
found in RELPs.113 Furthermore, the general partner's interest in the 
106. Id. at 840. 
107. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
108. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
110. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
111. The Delaware Supreme Court has defined "interested transaction" in the corporate con-
text as one where directors "appear on both sides of a transaction [or] expect to derive •.. 
personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self dealing, as opposed to a benefit which de-
volves upon the corporation or all stockholders ••.• " Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 
(Del. 1983). 
112. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
113. See Opsata, supra note 9, at 54. Consider further the following item regarding a roll-up 
completed by Southmark Corp.: 
Southmark Corp. last year consolidated 35 of its real estate partnership programs into 
one, National Realty L.P. Among other benefits, Southmark claimed that rolling up the 
partnerships would achieve economies of scale. Security holders went along with the deal. 
The predicted cost savings are proving elusive. National Realty's most recent financials 
show that for the nine months ended Sept. 30~ 1988] "other operating expenses" jumped 
47%, from $4.3 million to $6.3 million. A cryptic entry called "fees to affiliates" jumped 
more than 427%, from $137,000 to $722,000. 
Company says the increases in operating expenses are the result of a change in the "allo-
cation of the general partner's and affiliates' overhead incurred in connection with adminis-
tration of partnership properties." How would you put that in English? We'd say the guys 
who are running the place simply raised their own pay. 
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roll-up grows because of the change from a fixed-duration RELP to a 
RUE of potentially infinite duration.114 This allows the general part-
ner to continue to receive property management fees. 115 
Finally, the roll-up may enhance the general partner's percentage 
from the sale of properties. As one observer noted: 
[A]ny preferences or subordinations that existed in the individual part-
nerships are abolished in a roll-up. Previously, the general partner might 
have been prohibited from collecting management fees or taking a share 
of distributable cash flows until investors achieved return of capital or 
earned a specified return on investment. After a roll-up, future cash 
flows are divided among shareholders with no subordinations.116 
This improvement of the general partner's position represents another 
example of the general partner's incentive to roll partnerships into a 
RUE. As mentioned above, these facts lead some observers to assert 
that only general partners do well in a roll-up. 117 The roll-up there-
fore exemplifies the interested transaction which, according to Selig-
man, necessitates an appraisal remedy. Thus, under either Eisenberg's 
or Seligman's evaluation of the appraisal remedy, such protection is 
needed in the roll-up situation as well as in the case of a corporate 
merger. 
III. PROPOSED REMEDY 
Part III of this Note first provides an overview of a proposed rem-
edy, then sets forth the details of the remedy's structure, including 
how the RELP shares should be valued during the appraisal process. 
Part III then lists the benefits flowing from such legislation. Finally, 
this Part addresses the desirability of federal legislation and examines 
current congressional proposals. 
A. Overview of Remedy 
To address the lack of remedies available to dissenting limited 
partners, this Note suggests enactment of a statute with the following 
features. First, the remedy should require the general partner to in-
corporate notification of limited partners' right to dissent into the 
proxy materials. If limited partners do not wish to participate in the 
roll-up, they must provide the general partner with a notice of intent 
to dissent with their "no" votes. The general partner, after the vote 
approving the roll-up, must pay the dissenting limited partners what 
the general partner believes to be the fair value of the limited partners' 
RELP shares. Dissenters dissatisfied with this payment should then 
Forbes Infonner, FORBES, Jan. 9, 1989, at 16. 
114. See Subas & Donaldson, supra note 9, at 33. 
115. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. 
116. Margaret Opsata, Roll-ups Roll On, REAL EsT. FIN. J., Summer 1991, at 71, 73. 
117. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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have access to a judicial appraisal proceeding, to which all dissenters 
are joined. At this proceeding, the court should award the dissenters 
an amount based on the net asset value of the underlying real estate. 
The court should determine this value by appointing a qualified real 
estate appraiser, who uses the property valuation performed by the 
general partner in connection with the roll-up as a minimum to his or 
her appraisal. This suggested procedure is set forth in greater detail 
below. 
B. Proposed Remedy in Detail 
To find a workable remedy structure for dissenting RELP limited 
partners, a legislature need look no further than the appraisal remedy 
set forth in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act 
(RMBCA).118 The RMBCA's provisions, with a few adjustments, can 
promote the goal of providing dissenters with fair value for their 
RELP shares. 
The RMBCA "seeks to increase the frequency with which asser-
tion of dissenters' rights leads to economical and satisfying solutions, 
and to decrease the frequency with which they lead to delay, expense, 
and dissatisfaction."119 To accomplish this, the RMBCA "motivat[es] 
the parties to settle their differences in private negotiations, without 
resort to judicial appraisal proceedings."12o 
Section 13.20121 of the RMBCA requires that a corporation notify 
shareholders of their dissenters' rights under the appraisal statute in 
the shareholder meeting notice. Similarly, the RELP appraisal rem-
edy should require the general partner to notify the limited partners of 
their right to dissent. Because limited partnerships lack a counterpart 
to the shareholders' meeting, such notice could be required as part of 
the proxy materials.122 This notice would help provide a meaningful 
remedy to limited partners, many of whom would otherwise be una-
ware of any statutory protection.123 
Under section 13.21124 a dissenting shareholder must notify the 
118. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. Acr, ch. 13 (Comm. on Corporate Laws of the Sec-
tion of Corp., Banking & Business Law, Am. Bar Assn. 1991) [hereinafter RMBCA]. The 
RMBCA does not refer to its scheme as an "appraisal right," due to its emphasis on nonjudicial 
settlement of disputes regarding share value. The RMBCA prefers the term "dissenters' rights to 
obtain payment for their shares." RMBCA Ch. 13 intro. cmt. For simplicity, this Note will 
refer to these rights as "appraisal rights" or "appraisal remedy." 
119. RMBCA Ch. 13 intro. cmt. 
120. Id. 
121. RMBCA § 13.20. 
122. The general partner sends proxy materials to the limited partners to explain the roll-up 
and seek affirmative votes. Because these proxy materials tend to be long and complicated, the 
legislation should take steps to ensure that the notice of the right to dissent is not buried deep 
within a lengthy prospectus. 
123. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
124. RMBCA § 13.21. 
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corporation of an intent to assert dissenters' rights. To provide ad-
vance warning of the number of potential dissenters, the RMBCA re-
quires dissenters to provide this notice before the shareholder vote. If 
the shareholders approve the merger, section 13.22125 calls for the cor-
poration to "deliver a written dissenters' notice to all shareholders 
who satisfied the requirements of section 13.21."126 This notice in-
forms the shareholders of the payment demand procedure and sup-
plies them with a form for doing so. Pursuant to section 13.23,127 the 
shareholder must then demand payment for the shares within the time 
limits set forth in the dissenters' notice or lose his or her right to 
payment. 
When adapting sections 13.21, 13.22 and 13.23 to the roll-up situa-
tion, a legislature could consolidate these three steps. The notice of 
intent to dissent, as set forth in section 13.21, could be provided at the 
time the limited partner votes against the roll-up.128 A demand for 
payment could accompany the "no" vote, provided the notice of dis-
senters' rights includes instructions regarding these steps. Such a con-
solidation would shorten the process and make it less expensive.129 
Pursuant to section 13.25 the corporation must "pay each dis-
senter who complied with section 13.23 the amount the corporation 
estimates to be the fair value of his [or her] shares, plus accrued inter-
est."130 The provision mandating payment before reaching a final 
agreement on value "is based on the view that since the person's rights 
as a shareholder are terminated with the completion of the transac-
tion, he should have immediate use of the money to which the corpo-
ration agrees it has no further claim."131 This immediate payment 
could end the dispute, thereby advancing the RMBCA's goal of set-
tling these issues without resort to a court proceeding.132 To achieve 
this goal, a statute securing dissenters' rights for RELP limited part-
ners should incorporate a similar provision. 
If the payment does not satisfy the dissenter, the shareholder may 
have access to the court in a judicial appraisal proceeding. Following 
125. RMBCA § 13.22. 
126. RMBCA § 13.22(a). 
127. RMBCA § 13.23. 
128. Two states currently allow shareholders to wait until the vote to express their desire to 
dissent. RMBCA § 13.21 annot. (1990). 
129. Critics of appraisal remedies argue they are too complicated and expensive. See, e.g., 
Robert Prentice, Front-End Loaded, Two-Tiered Tender Offers: An Examination of the Counter-
productive Effects of a Mighty Offensive Weapon, 39 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 389, 435 (1989) 
(appraisal "cumbersome [and] expensive"); Richard Booth, Management Buyouts. Shareholder 
Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 650-53 (1985) (appraisal 
expensive and inaccurate). 
130. RMBCA § 13.25. 
131. RMBCA § 13.25 official cmt. 
132. See supra note 118. This is also a broader goal of the legal system. 
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section 13.30, 133 the RELP appraisal statute should require the gen-
eral partner to commence the court action, joining in one action all 
dissenters who notified the general partner of their desire to have ac-
cess to appraisal.134 The court may appoint one or more appraisers 
"to receive evidence and recommend decision on the question of fair 
value."13s The RMBCA declines to mandate how the appraisers de-
termine "fair value." Instead, it "leaves untouched the accumulated 
case law about market value, value based on prior sales, capitalized 
earnings value, and asset value."136 RELPs differ from corporations 
in this sense because they lack well-settled valuation methods, and dif-
fer sufficiently in other ways to suggest an obvious valuation method 
to be employed by a court in an appraisal proceeding. Thus, a legisla-
ture enacting a RELP appraisal statute need not take such a "hands 
off" approach to valuation and should therefore mandate use of net 
asset value. 
C. Valuation of the RELP Shares 
As discussed above, 137 market value represents the measure of a 
security's worth which is easiest to compute. Unfortunately, awarding 
market value to a dissenting RELP limited partner unjustly penalizes 
that investor.13s An attempt to emulate the RMBCA's goal of giving 
dissenters "a right to withdraw their investment at a fair value ... " 139 
mandates a search for a better measure of value. 
The courts have embarked on such a search in the corporate stock 
context. The Delaware Supreme Court, in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 140 
addressed the issue of valuation of minority stock in an appraisal pro-
ceeding. The court rejected the "Delaware block method"141 and 
called for an approach including "proof of value by any techniques or 
methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial 
133. RMBCA § 13.30. 
134. The joining of all dissenters would make the procedure less expensive and preclude 
duplicative litigation. For dissenters who share counsel to save money, some of the problems 
facing class action plaintiffs could arise. See supra notes 33-34. Most of these problems, how-
ever, will not appear in this context. For e~ple, no difficulty regarding a search for other 
plaintiffs will arise, as this burden will be placed on the general partner. Furthermore, it must be 
emphasized that this court procedure represents the final step in a long process during which 
settlement may occur. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. 
135. RMBCA § 13.30(d). Appointment of a court appraiser would help the parties avoid a 
costly "battle of the experts." , 
136. RMBCA § 13.01 official cmt. (3). 
137. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
138. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
139. RMBCA ch. 13, intro. cmt. 
140. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
141. The Delaware block method employed a weighted average of net asset value, earnings 
value, and market value. The weights assigned to each value varied from case to case. 
176 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:155 
community .... " 142 The court, however, gave little guidance as to 
what constitutes these "techniques or methods." 
This issue left open by the Weinberger court has been the subject of 
a great deal of literature.143 One observer set out to "discuss[ ] the 
rejected 'Delaware block' approach to valuation and suppl[y] the ra-
tionale for the rejection that is missing from ... Weinberger. " 144 This 
missing rationale turned out to be application of the "Discounted 
Cash Flow" (DCF) theory to stock valuation. 
The DCF method relies on the premise 
that all assets . . . have value because they provide a stream of future 
benefits. . . . [M]odem valuation theories assume that all benefits can be 
converted to periodic cash equivalents during the interval in which the 
asset is owned. The key valuation concept is to take this future stream of 
dollar-denominated benefits and convert it into a current value - a sin-
gle number of current dollars that is equivalent to the given stream of 
benefits over time.145 
The DCF method complies with the Weinberger mandate to use a 
technique acceptable in the financial community, as it is the most 
widely used stock valuation method.146 
Applying the DCF method to value a RELP would involve esti-
mating the future cash inflows, including rental income and proceeds 
from the sale of property, and offsetting these benefits by the future 
cash outflows, such as debt service, maintenance expenses, and admin-
istrative costs. Th'ese future cash flows would be discounted to obtain 
a present value of the RELP. The most important variable in this 
equation is the sale price of the property at the termination date of the 
partnership. As such, the liquidation value of the enterprise becomes 
the largest determinant of value. Reliance on liquidation value has 
been criticized in valuation of stocks, because it may have little proba-
tive value for an ongoing enterprise.147 In the RELP context, this crit-
icism does not apply. Although the RELP is an ongoing enterprise, it 
also represents an enterprise designed to terminate at a given date. 148 
142. 457 A.2d at 713. 
143. See, e.g., Dierdre A. Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Reappraising the Role of the Shareholder 
in the Modem Public Corporation: Weinberger's Procedural Approach to Fairness in Freezeouts, 
1984 WIS. L. REv. 593 (1984); Glenn C. Campbell, Note, Corporation Law - Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc.: Delaware Reevaluates State-Law Limitations on Take Out Mergers, 62 N.C. L. REV. 
812 (1984). 
144. David Cohen, Comment, Valuation in the Context of Share Appraisal. 34 EMORY L.J. 
117, 118 (1985). 
145. Id. at 127-28; see also EUGENE F. BRIGHAM, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 288-382 (1977). 
146. Cohen, supra note 144, at 131. 
147. See Cohen, supra note 144, at 135 (noting "fundamental inconsistency" in using liquida-
tion value in determining value of the stock of an ongoing enterprise); Heglar, supra note 61, at 
265 n.35 (listing authorities rejecting or limiting use of "net asset" or liquidation value). 
148. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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Liquidation value, in other words, is appropriate for an enterprise 
which, unlike a corporation, was meant to be liquidated. 
While discussing the problems inherent in a damages action, this 
Note concluded that net asset value is a better measure than market 
value of the "fair value" of RELP shares.149 This may appear to be 
inconsistent with the idea of utilizing DCF analysis, but net asset 
value actually approximates DCF. Assuming some level of value effi-
ciency in the real estate market, the value of the RELP's underlying 
real estate will equal the expected cash flows associated with that real 
estate.150 Thus, use of net asset value would yield the same benefits as 
DCF analysis, while still providing simplicity. A RELP appraisal 
should therefore call for the appointment of an appraiser to give the 
court an estimate of the RELP's net asset value. This estimate would 
determine the amount paid to the dissenting limited partners. 
In fact, the general partner causes an appraisal of the RELP's 
property to be conducted as part of the roll-up process.151 The general 
partner, however, has considerable incentive to inflate the appraisal. 
The structure of roll-ups ensures that the number of RUE shares the 
general partner receives is tied to the appraisal of the real estate.152 
Inflated estimates of the real estate value also increase estimated future 
cash flows, thereby making the roll-up appear more attractive to the 
voting limited partners. Thus, estimates of the RELP's net asset value 
already exist, albeit in a form somewhat biased toward higher values. 
These incentives would be reduced if the general partner's estimate 
of net asset value also determined the amount paid to dissenting lim-
ited partners. A better alternative would be to use these appraisals as 
a minimum value. Use of this floor would reduce the temptation to 
exaggerate the appraisals, but not give the general partner too much 
incentive to grossly underestimate the values. 
D. Benefits of the Proposed Remedy 
The primary benefit of the appraisal legislation described above is 
the better protection it offers RELP investors. As discussed earlier, 
many RELP investors planned to hold their investment until the ter-
mination date.153 By allowing dissenting limited partners to recover 
149. See supra section I.A.3. 
150. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
151. See Richard H. Ader, Anatomy of a Master Limited Partnership Roll-Up, REAL Esr. 
FIN. J., Spring 1988, at 16, 18. 
152. Id. (Appraisal of some properties in the Southmark roll-up were too high by 30%.); see 
also Opsata, supra note 9, at 53. 
153. See supra text accompanying note 62. Of course, some investors who have voted for the 
roll-up have adjusted their expectations and are enticed by the roll-up's promised liquidity. This 
does not mean, however, that all investors who voted in favor of the roll-up have changed expec-
tations, as liquidity is not the only promise made by general partners with respect to roll-ups. See 
supra note 9. 
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the fair value of their shares, undiminished by an illiquidity discount 
that would unfairly penalize the limited partner, 154 the statute would 
protect these legitimate expectations. 
In addition to providing a remedy where none existed before, 155 
this Note's proposal, by establishing procedures and defining the scope 
of inquiry, would make the process less expensive. While a limited 
partner would incur some expense pursuing the dissenters' rights, the 
amount involved would almost certainly be less than the sum required 
to litigate the many issues156 that, in the absence of a dissenters' rights 
statute, must be litigated. 
Many critics of appraisal remedies point to the relative paucity of 
case law on the subject as proof of the prohibitive cost of such proce-
dures.157 Indeed, expense can prove problematic in current state ap-
praisal remedies which do not require the corporation to join all 
dissenters as parties to one appraisal proceeding.158 This Note's pro-
posal would address the cost problem by requiring the general partner 
to join all dissenters as parties to one appraisal proceeding. Further-
more, the lack of case law under state appraisal statutes may be a re-
sult of the statutes' more efficient dispute resolution procedure.159 
Because a statute addressing roll-ups should likewise emphasize nego-
tiation before resorting to the court, many roll-up disputes could be 
resolved without litigation. 
Finally, a statute forcing the general partner to pay fair value for 
dissenters' RELP shares will deter some ill-conceived roll-ups. For 
example, many roll-ups have lumped profitable RELPs with unprofita-
ble ones.160 Because the general partner could expect a fairly substan-
tial level of dissent from holders of the profitable RELPs, the general 
partner would be less likely to pursue such damaging roll-ups. The 
statute cannot guarantee that only sensible roll-ups take place, but it 
can reduce the number of roll-ups completed in the future. While roll-
ups need not be damaging per se, a decrease in the frequency of roll-
ups must be considered a benefit, given the amount of losses incurred 
as a result of roll-ups thus far.161 
154. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
155. See supra Part I. 
156. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
157. E.g., Seligman, supra note 90, at 829-30 (noting low frequency of appraisal proceedings 
and suggesting expense may be a factor discouraging such actions). 
158. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
159. See Seligman, supra note 90, at 830. 
160. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
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E. The Need for Federal Legislation 
1. The Advantages of Federal Legislation 
Showing the need for legislation and suggesting a statutory struc-
ture does not quite complete the picture. The issue arises as to 
whether this statute should be enacted by Congress or by the states. 
The debate between the desirability of federal action versus state legis-
lation is not new. In the corporate context, scholars have long debated 
the need for federal regulation to replace the existing system of control 
by the states.162 One voice strongly advocating "federalization" of 
corporate law has been that of Professor William Cary. In his 1974 
article examining the corporate law of Delaware, 163 Cary concluded 
that states' desire to attract corporations has led to a "race for the 
bottom, with Delaware in the lead .... " 164 Cary criticized Delaware's 
efforts to attract corporations by making its law attractive to manage-
ment, asserting that "the raison d'etre behind the whole system [is] 
revenue for the state of Delaware"165 and that there might not be any 
"public policy left in Delaware corporate law except the objective of 
raising revenue."166 
The federal government, by enacting the legislation described in 
this Note, could prevent any such "race for the bottom" with respect 
to limited partnerships. Although states' financial incentive to attract 
partnerships may not be as strong as it is to attract corporations, states 
can earn revenue in the way of transaction fees or other taxes by luring 
partnerships. General partners, noting the difference in state laws re-
garding roll-ups, could seek to have the partnership agreement 
amended so that the partnership is based in a state with little or no 
protection against roll-ups. The utter lack of an effective remedy for a 
limited partner confronted with a roll-up mandates that protection for 
the limited partner, rather than a government's need for income, 
should drive the structure of the law .167 
Dangers other than a "race for the bottom" lie in potentially in-
consistent state regulation. RELP holders already suffer from the dif-
162. See Allen D. Boyer, Federalism and Corporation Law: Drawing the Line in State Take-
over Regulation, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 1037 (1986) (historical overview of debate over need for federal 
regulation of corporations). 
163. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663 (1974). 
164. Id. at 705. 
165. Id. at 668. 
166. Id. at 684. For a contrary view, see Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protec-
tion, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 290 (1977). 
167. Even if states do not engage in a "race for the bottom" to raise revenue, differences in 
state laws are bound to exist. To the extent different states provide varying levels of protection, 
general partners will have an incentive to find a state offering little or no protection against roll-
ups. 
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ficulties associated with owning a thinly traded security. 168 Allowing 
states to control regulation in this area would result in inconsistent 
rules which vary from state to state, depending on the home state of 
the partnership. Subjecting different RELPs to varying levels of pro-
tection could only complicate trading, thereby adding to the imperfec-
tions of the RELP market. Federal legislation represents the best 
chance at consistent protection for limited partners.169 
The debate over the merits of federal and state regulation has also 
occurred in the area of corporate mergers. One commentator has ex-
amined two-tier mergers and concluded "notions of federalism dictate 
state regulation of the second step transaction."17° Further, "a state 
may be interested in preventing the loss of local employment that oc-
curs when a corporation relocates to another state [and] avoiding 
other adverse impact on the local economy."171 The differences be-
tween a corporate merger and a roll-up suggest rejection of the appli-
cation of this argument to roll-up legislation. The state has no such 
interest in regulating roll-ups. A roll-up does not lead to loss of em-
ployment or any other such adverse effects on the local economy.172 
Rather, it simply rearranges the form of ownership of the underlying 
real estate. 
These "notions of federalism" - i.e., the practice of allowing 
states to govern local interests - cannot stand up to the other reasons 
for preferring federal legislation. The urgency of the situation repre-
sents the foremost of these reasons. As mentioned, over $3 billion 
worth of RELPs could be rolled-up if the limited partners receive no 
protection.173 Although enactment of federal legislation may prove a 
lengthy process, it certainly can be accomplished more quickly than 
enactment of legislation by fifty state legislatures. 
Furthermore, a federal appraisal statute would not constitute a 
congressional excursion into an area previously controlled only by the 
states. Limited partnership interests already fall under the regulation 
168. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
169. Although promulgation of a uniform act could help achieve some consistency, the time 
required to enact such legislation in each state's legislature would be prohibitive. Furthermore, 
uniform acts do not always result in consistent legislation. See, e.g., Therese H. Maynard, The 
Uniform Limited Offering Exemption: How "Uniform" Is "Uniform?'~ 36 EMORY L.J. 357, 361· 
62 (1987) (most of 27 states enacting ULOE have modified its terms). 
170. Robert 0. Ball, III, Note, Second Step Transactions in Two-Tiered Takeovers: The Case 
for State Regulation, 9 GA. L. REv. 343, 370 (1985). For a contrary view, see Robert J. Graves, 
Note, A Failed Experiment: State Takeover Regulation After Edgar v. Mite Corp., 1983 U. ILL. 
L. REv. 457, 476 ("[S]tate legislatures should repeal their takeover statutes and leave ••• regula-
tion ... to the federal government."). 
171. Ball, supra note 170, at 371. 
172. Of course, a roll-up may have some small effect on a local economy by decreasing the 
net worth of limited partners living in the area. State regulation, however, would come from the 
state in which the partnership is organized, not the state in which the limited partner resides. 
The two states are often not the same. 
173. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
October 1991] Note - Limited Partnership "Roll-Ups" 181 
of the Securities Act of 1933.174 Because limited partnership interests 
meet the criteria of an "investment contract" set forth by the Supreme 
Court in S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 175 courts have held these interests 
to be securities subject to regulation under the 1933 Act.176 Thus, fed-
eral action would amount to a simple exercise of Congress' well-estab-
lished regulatory power. 
2. Cu"ent Congressional Proposals 
Some members of Congress, sensing the need for federal legisla-
tion, have introduced legislation to protect limited partners from roll-
ups. Representative Edward Markey has introduced H.R. 1885;177 
meanwhile, Senator Christopher Dodd has proposed a similar bill, S. 
1423.178 Each of these bills ca11s for more complete and clearer disclo-
sure to limited partners asked to approve a roll-up.179 Furthermore, 
each proposal mandates availability of an appraisal for each limited 
partner who desires one.180 
While the reforms suggested by these measures would do much to 
alleviate limited partners' problems with roll-ups, the proposals leave 
many problems unresolved. Neither bill sets forth in any detail how 
the appraisal is to be conducted. For example, neither proposal ad-
dresses how the parties are to determine a value for the RELP shares. 
Thus, it would be up to the Securities and Exchange Commission, in 
its rulemaking capacity, to handle issues such as whether the value of 
the RELP shares should be reduced by an illiquidity discount.181 If 
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988). 
175. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
176. See, e.g., Reeves v. Teuscher, 881 F.2d 1495, 1499 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989); Rodeo v. Gill-
man, 787 F.2d 1175, 1177-78 (7th Cir. 1986); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41 (9th Cir. 
1980). 
177. H.R. 1885, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
178. S. 1423, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Furthermore, a senate bill has been introduced 
which would impose a tax for all roll-ups which do not provide limited partners with dissenters' 
rights. S. 1393, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
179. H.R. 1885, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1991); S. 1423, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) 
(1991). 
180. H.R. 1885, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)-(c) (1991); S. 1423, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)-
(c) (1991). The bills also would amend proxy rules to allow limited partners to "engage in pre-
liminary discussions for the purposes of determining whether to solicit proxies •••• " E.g., S. 
1423. 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1991). In addition, each would require any prospectus or 
solicitation to be "clear, concise, and understandable." E.g., S. 1423, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) 
(1991). One major point of contention during subcommittee debate over the bills has been the 
definition of partnerships subject to the statute. Proponents of reform fear that too narrow a 
definition will provide a loophole in the act and fail to adequately protect limited partners. 
181. See supra Section I.A.3. The SEC recently adopted rules with respect to roll-ups. The 
rules prohibit brokers from receiving higher compensation for soliciting "yes" votes than for 
obtaining "no" votes from limited partners. The rules limit broker compensation to 2% of the 
exchange value of the newly created securities and ensure broker compensation notwithstanding 
rejection of the proposed roll-up by the limited partners. Order Granting Approval of Proposed 
Rule Change Relating to Compensation in Connection with the Solicitation of Roll-Ups, 56 Fed. 
Reg. 42,095, 42,096 (1991). While these reforms appear useful, the changes may not be sufficient 
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one of these measures (or similar legislation) becomes law, the SEC 
will determine exactly how well the statute protects limited partners. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the promises of general partners, roll-ups have not helped 
limited partners salvage their investments. On the contrary, most 
RUEs have performed quite poorly on the market. Despite this, over 
$3 billion worth of RELPs could be the subject of future roll-ups. 
Although there are indications that limited partners may not be as 
quick to approve roll-ups as they have in the past, 182 a limited partner 
who does not wish to participate in the roll-up has no alternative if a 
majority of the limited partners approves it. Litigation offers little 
hope to limited partners, who, on the average, hold small investments. 
Some states have attempted to address the roll-up problem, but only 
federal legislation can effectively regulate roll-ups. 
This Note suggests a statutory framework for providing dissenting 
limited partners with an alternative to roll-ups. The suggested scheme 
aids limited partners by protecting their reasonable expectations 
through an appraisal remedy. Also, by delineating many of the logis-
tics of the appraisal process, such a statute would reduce the expense 
associated with the procedure. Finally, a law requiring payment of 
fair value for dissenting limited partners' RELP shares may discour-
age some general partners from proposing ill-conceived roll-ups. 
Although many members of Congress perceive the need for federal 
legislation, the bills proposed thus far lack specificity. The sponsors of 
these measures have chosen instead to leave the details to the SEC 
rulemaking process. It is possible that the SEC may promulgate rules 
which mandate a procedure similar to the one suggested here. If so, 
these legislators' efforts to protect limited partners will be a success. 
On the other hand, the bills may be defeated or the SEC may make 
rules which lack essential features, such as awarding dissenters an 
amount based on the value of the underlying real estate. In that event, 
dissenting limited partners may find themselves in their original pre-
dicament - confronted by a roll-up with no viable alternative to 
participation. 
to protect limited partners. See Tracey L. Longo, NASD Board OKs Equal-Pay Rule for Ro/1-Up 
Votes, INvEsrMENT DEALERS' DIG., May 27, 1991, at 8. 
182. See Barry Vinocur, Protests Build Over the Ro/1-Up Binge, BARRON'S, Jan. 7, 1991, at 
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